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selves; and the author allows them to do so by spreading them over two
pages of his book.s The crude conceptualism and ignoring of facts on
the part of the Committee in attempting to segregate "policy determination"
from "adjudication" and in its assertion of "irresponsibility" on the part
of this Commission and of others, will carry no conviction to Professor
Sharfman's readers. To the author it is clear, as it should be to those who
follow his exposition, that the "quasi-judicial methods" employed in the
performance of the Commission's regulatory functionso do not imply that
the Commission is there merely judging disputes in the light of previously
formulated policy. The policy grows as conditions arise which need to be
dealt with. Hence it is "grounded in the realities" 20 and the decisions are
"equitable in substance,"21 at the same time that regulatory policy is stable
in comparison with political control. As contrasted with these character-
istics of the present set-up, reorganization based upon dogma has little to
offer.
As the author brings out, the Commission is confronted at present with
an enormously increased load because of the addition of the function of
regulating transportation by motor vehicles. It is falling rapidly behind
in its docket in that branch of its work. Not only will new administrative
expedients have to be devised, but it is of the highest importance that ade-
quate appropriations for accounting and staff services be made. At previ-
ous periods in its history the Commission has been seriously hampered by
stringency in this respect. 22 The present situation is not promising.23 Thus,
ironically, the Commission, devotedly and efficiently rendering an essential
service to the nation, finds itself condemned in a report to the Chief Execu-
tive and inadequately supplied with funds by the people's representatives
at a time when the need for governmental planning and control is being
stressed as never before. It has, on the other hand, consistently commanded
the confidence and respect of Congress and the courts and of the commu-
nity at large. Therein must lie the reward of its members, as well as some
assurance that the demos will not fail to profit from this unique achieve-
ment in the art of government. Its counterparts, as everyone knows, are
now numerous in the land. RALPH F. FucHs.t
THE MIND OP THE JUROR. By Albert S. Osborn. Albany, New York: The
Boyd Printing Company, 1938. Pp. xv, 239.
This book, by the well known author of Questioned Documents and The
Problem of Proof, will be appreciated by all interested in the administration
of justice.
As suggested in the preface, the main interest of many pleaders "appears
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to be in the fact of evidence rather than in the effect of evidence." Per-
haps this, in a measure, accounts for the fact that many experienced lawyers
regard the verdict of a jury as unpredictable.
It seems reasonable that an intelligent study of the mind of the juror
as judge of the facts will point the way to more sense and certainty in
verdicts. The advocate himself is incapable of an unbiased approach. The
individual juror's service is generally infrequent. The impressions of an
experienced witness are invaluable, and these are here recorded with unusual
clarity and wisdom.
Within the compass of about two hundred pages, under thirty-three dis-
tinct headings, the author has trenchantly stated the experiences and ob-
servations of many years spent as a witness in jury trials involving ques-
tioned documents that have taken him all over the United States and into
most of the provinces of Canada. He has had unusual opportunity to see
lawyers as others see them. His unflinching analyses, pitched upon the high
plane of the public interest, may well command the attention of judges and
practitioners as well as law school teachers and students.
FRANK E. ATWOD.t
THE LAW OF NATIONS. By Marcellus Donald A. R. von Redlich. Phoenix,
Arizona: World League for Permanent Peace, 1937. Pp. XXIII, 640.
The above mentioned book was very severely criticized by Mr. Stefan A.
Riesenfeld, in a review appearing in the February, 1938, issue of the WASH-
INGTON UNIvERSITY LAW QUARTERLY. 1 It is the purpose of this answer to
show that Mr. Riesenfeld's accusations were unjust and that his statements
were absolutely erroneous.
The reviewer failed to comprehend the statement appearing in the pref-
ace, to the effect that "The book sets forth an exposition of legal principles
as accepted by the Courts, and, in the main, is based on cases adjudicated
in the Courts. Writers on the Law of Nations, who are well known inter-
nationally and acknowledged as authorities are cited freely. It has been
observed that some writers on the Law of Nations frequently give not what
is, but what they believe ought to be, the Law of Nations. The author here
definitely restricts himself to descriptions of what the Law of Nations
actually is. Speculation has been consistently avoided and he limits himself
to as few personal observations and opinions as possible. ' 2
It is a grave error on the part of Mr. Riesenfeld to say that the book
"contains many things which have not the slightest, or very little, con-
nection with the subject." He claims that Admiralty Jurisdiction, the status
of the District of Columbia, etc., do not belong within a book of this char-
acter. If Mr. Riesenfeld will consult John Bassett Moore's Digest of Inter-
national Law he will find Admiralty Jurisdiction treated,3 the status of the
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